In a report published on 2 November 2026, the American Foreign Policy Council examines how Beijing uses digital infrastructure to extend its influence abroad. From Senegal’s national data centre to the cables linking Asia and Europe, Chinese companies supply equipment and services that partner countries may rely on long after installation.
Financing opens doors
The Digital Silk Road is the technology arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. According to the report’s authors, Ilan Berman and Calla O’Neil, Chinese companies can offer equipment, services and financing as part of the same package. For governments looking to upgrade their infrastructure, the availability of a loan can matter as much as the price of the equipment when choosing a supplier.
Senegal offers an example. In June 2021, President Macky Sall announced that government data and digital platforms hosted abroad would be moved to the data centre in Diamniadio. A Chinese loan financed the project, and Huawei supplied equipment and technical support. Dakar presented the move as a way to strengthen its digital sovereignty.
The project served two interests. Senegal sought to bring government data home, while Huawei secured a role in the infrastructure that would house it. Dakar’s room for manoeuvre now depends on its ability to operate and upgrade that infrastructure.
Influence grows after installation
Once the equipment is in service, the cost of switching suppliers depends on how well different systems work together. A change may require adapting software, migrating data and retraining staff. If the same provider also supplies cloud services and analytics tools, the switch can affect several services at once.
Those costs give the incumbent supplier an advantage when equipment needs replacing or a network is due for expansion. Over time, these decisions can give Chinese companies greater influence over the technologies their customers adopt. The more an administration invests in a set of compatible tools, the stronger its incentive to choose products that work with what it already has.
Submarine cables illustrate how responsibilities can be shared. The PEACE cable, backed by investment from China’s Hengtong Group, links Asia and Europe via East Africa. In France, Orange handled the cable’s landing in Marseille and operates the landing station. Several companies thus have distinct roles in the project.
Who controls the data?
The American Foreign Policy Council argues that the presence of Chinese suppliers in networks, data centres and urban management systems could make it easier for Beijing to gain access to certain information. Establishing whether such access occurs in any given project requires knowing who administers the system, what permissions the supplier retains and which data those permissions allow it to see.
Partner governments have leverage when negotiating contracts. They can specify who has administrative access, require that data can be exported and set the terms under which another provider can take over. Those provisions help determine how easily a government can switch suppliers once a system is up and running.
For Beijing, the strategic advantage lies in the lasting role Chinese companies can secure in infrastructure that foreign governments and operators rely on. For partner countries, the balance of power becomes clear when they need to upgrade a network, renegotiate a contract or hand over operations to a new provider.
